II. To the Initial Arguments of the First Side

76. To the first main argument [n.33], I concede that sin is not formally the privation of grace, as some arguments proceeded for the first conclusion [nn.41-43]; and from this I concede that the introducing of grace or of any virtue is not formally the expulsion of guilt.

77. But if you wish to prove from the authority [n.33] that there are two changes, infusion and expulsion, and thereby that sinning and the corrupting of grace are two changes, therefore, by similarity, in the issue at hand - I reply: the consequence is not valid, because this fault, toward which is the motion of sinning, does not remain up to the infusion of grace, nor could it be the term ‘from which’ of change proper. But when the fault passes, there remains in the person only the obligation as it is the secondary object of the divine will; and in the justification there cannot be a term ‘from which’ of any change proper.

78. To the second [nn.34] it is plain why there are two changes there in morals, because there are four terms there: two real positive ones and two real privative ones. It is not so here, as is plain. The same is plain as to the point about generation and corruption [n.35].

79. To the last argument [n.36] about the disposition for the form for which it disposes, I say that this passive remission, which is the lack of obligation to a penalty, is not a real disposition for friendship or grace; and so this remission, taken as having its term in this lack [sc. of obligation], is not a real change. Therefore, if you take it that the remission-change is a disposition for the change that is infusion of grace, I deny it; because remission is not a change, neither active nor passive, neither real nor of reason.