a. First Opinion, which is from Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas

α. Fundamental Reasons for the Opinion

181. Here the statement is made that the human nature of Christ is only prime matter and intellective soul.

And for this there are four fundamental reasons.

182. The first is this: of one being there is one ‘to be’; one ‘to be’ is from one form; therefore of one being there is one form.

183. And there is a confirmation from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 7.12.1038a5-34, the chapter on the unity of definition [Aquinas Commentary on Metaphysics 7.7, 12 ad loc.]. Here the Philosopher maintains that “the genus is nothing beside what are the species of the genus;” and in the same place, “the final difference will be the substance of the thing and the definition;” and in the same place, “There is no order in substance; for how should one understand that this one is prior and that one posterior?” From all these one obtains the result that the unity of definition comes from the fact that the genus is nothing besides the things of which it is the genus, and that the difference that possesses the formal idea states the whole substance of a thing. So there are not different forms there; because if from a first form were taken the genus and from a second the difference, the genus would be something besides the species, at least as to its quidditative ‘to be’; and the ultimate difference would not be the whole substance of the defined thing; also, there would be an order in a thing’s substance according to the order of forms. The Philosopher also seems to say in the same place [Metaphysics 7.12.1038a15] that a later difference includes a prior difference, for the cleaving of the foot into toes is a certain sort of footedness. But a later difference would not include the prior difference if the differences were taken from different forms. (For this first reason is taken from ‘unity per se’ [Ord. IV d.1 nn.63-64].)

184. The second reason is taken from the difference between accidental form and substantial form, because substantial form bestows ‘being simply’ and accidental form ‘being in a certain respect’. Thence there follows another difference, that accidental form comes to what is a being simply, and substantial form only to what is a being in potency. A third difference is that in the case of substance there is generation simply (because it is from potency simply to being simply), and in the case of accident generation in a certain respect. But if a substantial form could follow another substantial form in the same thing, these differences would not be preserved; for the second substantial form would not give being simply, since it would come to a being in act, and would be generation in a certain respect. And this last middle term, namely about generation, is given special weight because, according to the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a10-32, generation is not motion, for two reason he touches on there. The first is that what is moved exists; what is generated does not exist. The second is that what is moved is in place and what is generated is not in place; and he is speaking in both cases taking ‘what is generated’ for the subject of generation. Therefore, the subject of generation simply is not, and has no form by which it can be in place; but if a prior form were posited, then through it at least it would be a subject simply and could be in place.

185. The third reason is taken from predication, because when predication is taken from diverse forms either it is per accidens predication, as when the forms are not per se in an order (as ‘man is white’), or if the forms are per se in an order, there is predication per se in the second mode of predication per se (as ‘the surface is white’). Therefore if the genus is taken from one form and the species from another (which one has to say if one posits in man several forms), it follows that predicating the genus of man will not be predication in the first mode of predication per se.

186. A fourth reason can be formed, and it is worth more than all the preceding ones: “plurality is not to be posited without necessity,” from Physics 1.4.188a17-18; but it is not necessary to posit many forms, because the more perfect contains in it virtually the more imperfect (as the quadrilateral contains the triangle), from On the Soul 2.3.414b29-32; therefore it is superfluous to posit the other form distinct from the more perfect form that contains it.

β Applications to the Issue at Hand and Rejection of them

187. Those who rely on these reasons, and hold to the conclusion of them, apply them to the issue at hand.

188. For it is said in one way [Thomas Aquinas] that the first term of this conversion is a composite of matter and intellective soul, not as the soul is intellective or as it constitutes the composite that is man, but as it gives bodily being and constitutes the composite that is body. For it is the same soul and constitutes body in being of man and in being of animal and in being of body and of substance, and this because (without distinction between form and form) it virtually contains the more perfect form. And in this way can something act first through the soul as it gives bodily being, although it does not do the same action through the soul as it gives intellective being, and thus can it be the term of action under the former sort of idea but not under the latter sort.

189. Against this:

If the host, when consecrated by Christ at the Last Supper, had been conserved in a pyx during the Triduum, it would have remained there as the first contained thing. But that into which conversion was first made was not prime matter nor the accidents nor the composite of matter and accident; therefore it was some composite of matter and substantial form; therefore that would always have remained during the Triduum. But it was then not composed of matter and intellective soul, because Christ was truly dead during the Triduum, for he truly died on the cross. And also because his intellective soul was truly separated; but it cannot be that it was both truly separated from and united to the body (from IV d.10 n.258).

190. Again, the term of this conversion ought to be something real, because the conversion is real. But the intellective soul as it gives bodily being, in distinction from intellective being, is (according to some [Henry of Ghent]) not any real being but only something abstracted by an act of the intellect, just as what is common, according to them, is something besides the singulars. Therefore, this conversion cannot be into the soul under the idea of its being the term of the conversion.

191. Someone else, holding to the same conclusion [n.181; Giles of Rome], says that the matter as possessing quantitative mode is the composite into which conversion of the bread is made. For quantity leaves behind in the matter a certain extended mode of the parts, which mode is not any accident in the matter, and yet the matter in that mode is something composite, so much so even that it could be called ‘body’, as he himself makes clear. And for this reason he denies that there is quantity in the per se term of the conversion, because there would be no transubstantiation if some accident were required in the per se term; and then also quantity would be there first, which they [Giles and Thomas Aquinas] deny, and others generally.

192. On the contrary: I ask whether the quantitative mode is the same as matter precisely taken or not. If it is, and conversion is made into the matter in this way, then conversion is made of all the bread into matter most precisely taken, and consequently there is no matter converted into matter and form into form,Sc. matter taken as precisely as matter does not differ into matter under this form or matter under that form, for as taken precisely it has no reference to this form or to that. So there can be no conversion of it taken precisely, for there is thus no different matter or form for it to be converted into. ²³ which he denies. If the quantitative mode is not matter precisely taken, then: either the quantitative mode is nothing and so conversion is made into nothing because the formal term of the conversion is pure nothing; or the conversion is made precisely into the matter, and then words are being multiplied fruitlessly.If the quantitative mode is other than matter precisely taken, then it is nothing, for by supposition there is nothing but matter there, since conversion, as Giles says, is not into anything with quantity. If the quantitative mode is precisely the matter, then nothing is added by talking about it. ²⁴

193. Or there is something else in the matter: either a substantial or an accidental form. If a substantial form and it is not the intellective soul, the proposed conclusion is gained that there is another substantial form in the body of Christ [n.186]. If it is an accidental form, the unacceptable result follows which he believes he is avoiding, namely that in the per se term of this conversion there is contained some accident [n.191].

194. Again, nothing caused by a posterior can be the same as what is naturally prior; this mode, for you, is caused and left behind by quantity [n.191], which is naturally posterior to the substance of the matter; therefore it cannot be the same substantially as the matter. The proof of the major is that if it is really the same as the prior, it does not depend really on it; but a posterior depends really on a prior, and a prior does not depend really on a posterior; therefore it follows that it does depend and does not depend. And the major of this reasoning is further plain because it is a contradiction for something to be and for something else not to be that is the same as it; but if this did not depend on anything, and that which is the same as it did depend, the former could be without the latter.

195. Again, that body, which you posit as the first term of the conversion, is either a mathematical body or a natural body (for the Philosopher did not distinguish body into more divisions [Physics 4.8.216a27-b8; Ord. II d.2 nn.216-218]). If it is a mathematical body then it includes quantity actually; therefore, you have what you are avoiding. If it is a natural body, then either through a natural substantial form or through quality; if in the first way, the proposed conclusion is gained, that the form is not the intellective soul; if in the second way and the natural quality presupposes quantity, the proposed conclusion is still gained, because the first term of the conversion would include matter with quantity and quality, and it will not only be a being per accidens but doubly a being per accidens.The proposed conclusion is gained because the matter without accidents will be what conversion is into (n.191), which returns to the former view that the body is a natural body through a natural substantia form. ²⁵

196. Again, the words of consecration are not more efficacious as regard the blood than as regard the body; but when ‘this is the cup’ or ‘this is the blood’ is said, the term of the conversion there cannot be imagined to be matter alone under a quantitative mode, because that is not blood; for blood states some substance that is generated from consumed nutriment and is next to be converted into flesh, and it would be neither generated nor converted unless it had a proper substantial form. In addition too, the body is not posited as something abstracted from the truth of flesh and bone and the like, but rather as it includes all the parts of what is first capable of being ensouled; but if ‘this is flesh’ or ‘this is bone’ were said, it would seem a fiction to posit that the term of conversion is only matter under a quantitative mode; therefore much more so in the issue at hand, when taking ‘body’ as it is something that includes all these, the way it is taken here.

γ. Insufficiency of Both Solutions

197. So these ways, then, which hold to this negative conclusion that in the body of Christ there is no other form than the intellective form - neither of them sufficiently saves the truth of the Eucharist. But neither sufficiently saves the truth of the thing contained in the Eucharist, namely the truth of the body of Christ, because as the body living and dead was the same in natural existence so also is it in the Eucharist.

198. This is proved by many authorities:

Of these one is from Ambrose On the Mysteries ch.9 n.53 (and it is in Gratian Decretum p.3 d.2 ch.74), who says, “The body indeed that was taken from the Virgin, that suffered and was buried, that rose from the dead and ascended into heaven.”

119. Pope Leo says the same in his sermon On the Lord’s Ascension tr.73 serm.1 ch.3, “We hold not with doubtful faith but with most firm knowledge that that nature will sit on the throne of the Father which had lain in the tomb.”

200. The same is obtained from Augustine in a sermon that begins “All things, most beloved.” [in fact Faustus de Riez, On the Lord’s Ascension sermo 1 n.1].

201. Against Augustine [in fact Fulgentius On the Faith to Peter ch.2 n.11], “The same man in the womb of his Mother both hung on the cross and lay in the tomb and resurrected.” But this identity cannot be understood save by reason of the part that is the body.

202. Damascene also maintains this Orthodox Faith ch.74, “He set aside none of the parts of nature.”

203. Again, Gregory on John 20.11, “Mary was standing...” (Homily 40 on John), “What he laid in the tomb in dying, that he lifted above the angels in rising.”

204. Also from Augustine [in fact Vigilius Tapsensis, To Felicianus ch.14], “He did not abandon the flesh in the tomb that he formed in the womb.”

205. This is also confirmed by Innocent III (Gregory IX Decretals III tit.41 ch.8), “From the side of the Savior flowed blood and water, in which have been instituted the two principal sacraments, baptism and the Eucharist.” Therefore the Eucharist, as here indicated, both signifies the blood that flowed from the side and is efficacious by virtue of that blood. But it only signifies the blood that is part of the body, and it is only efficacious in virtue of the blood that flowed from the body of Christ; therefore the body from which the blood flowed was the body of Christ. But this blood flowed from the dead body, because John 19 says that when Christ was already dead “one of the soldiers opened his side, since they saw that Jesus was already dead.” Therefore the already dead body was the same as the body of Christ alive.

206. Again, commenting on Jonah 2.7, “You will raise from corruption.” Jerome says, “The very same body and very same flesh rise that were buried in the earth.”