SCEPTICISM.
The only dispute that Christians can enter upon with philosophers is on this matter of fact:—whether the Scripture was written by inspired authors? If the arguments the Christians allege on this subject do not convince the philosophers, they ought to break off the dispute; for it would be to no purpose to enter into the particular discussion of the Trinity, &c. with people who disown the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, the sole and only way to judge who is in the right or wrong in such controversies. Revealed authority ought to be the common principle of disputants hereupon, and therefore there is no disputing when this principle is denied, and the other admits of it: “Adversus negantem principia non est disputandum.”
If they who deny it persist to clamour and dispute, they ought to be coldly answered, you depart from the question, “Non feritis thesim, non probatis ne gatum,” and if they laugh at this answer, their laughing ought to be despised and pitied.
But of all the philosophers who ought not to be allowed to dispute concerning the mysteries of Christianity, before they have admitted revelation for a rule, there are none so unworthy of being heard as the followers of Pyrrho, for they make profession of admitting no certain marks of distinction between truth and falsehood; so that if truth, by chance, appeared to diem, they could never be sure that it was
truth. They not only attack the testimony of the senses, the maxims of morality, the rules of logic, the axioms of metaphysics, but endeavour to overthrow the demonstrations of geometry, and the most evident principles of the mathematicians. If they went no farther than the ten reasons for suspending our assent, and only used them against natural philosophy, we might still treat with them, but they will go much farther; they have a sort of arms they call the diallel, which they lay hold of on the first occasion, and afterwards there is no withstanding them in any subject whatever. It is a labyrinth, from which no clue of Ariadne can wind us out. They lose themselves in their own subtilties, and are wonderfully pleased with it, since this serves to shew more clearly the universality of their hypothesis, that every thing is uncertain, from which they except not even the arguments against uncertainty. They proceed so far in their method, that they who have well considered the consequences of it are forced to say, that they know not whether any thing exists.Divines ought not to be ashamed to confess, that they cannot enter the lists with such disputants, and that they will not expose the gospel-truths to such an encounter. The vessel of Jesus Christ is not made to float upon that tempestuous sea, but to ride secure from this tempest in the haven of faith. It has pleased the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, must Christians say, to lead us by the way of faith, and not of science or disputation. They are our instructors and directors; we cannot err, having such guides, and reason itself commands us to prefer them before its own direction.
Some say that I have very improperly related the conversation of an abbot, who owns that Scepticism finds several arguments in the doctrines of Christianity, which render it more formidable than it was. I answer, " that this can offend none but such as have
not examined the character of Christianity. It would be a false notion to imagine, that Jesus Christ had any design to countenance, either directly or indirectly, some of the sects of philosophers in the disputes they had against the rest. His design was rather to confound all philosophy, and to shew the vanity of it. He was willing that his Gospel should clash not only with the religion of the Heathens, but with the aphorisms of their wisdom, and that notwithstanding this opposition betwixt his principles and those of the world, his doctrine should triumph over the Gentiles, by the ministry of a few illiterate men, who had neither eloquence nor logic, nor any of the instruments necessary to all other revolutions. He would have his disciples, and the wise men of this world, to be so diametrically opposite, that they should mutually call one another fools: he designed, that as his gospel appeared folly to the philosophers, their science should in its turn appear folly to the Christians. Consider well these words of St Paul:“For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness, but unto us which are saved, it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Because
the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called. But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty, and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen; yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are, that no flesh should glory in his presence. But of Him are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption; that, according as it is written, he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord. And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. For I determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness, and in fear and in much trembling. And my speech, and my preaching was not with enticing words of man’s wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit, and of power, that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought. But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory. Which none of the princes of this world knew, for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory. But as it is written, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received, not the Spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. Which things also we speak, not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.”Do you think that if the Apostles had been told that their doctrine exposed the dogmatizing philosophers to new attacks from the Sceptics, they would have been concerned at it? They would have said, “Let us not trouble ourselves with their disputes: Let the dead bury the dead; the more they contend and disable one another, the more they will discover the vanity of their pretended science. Neither the Dogmatists nor the Sceptics will ever be able to enter into the kingdom of God, unless they become little children, unless they change their maxims, renounce their wisdom, and make a burnt-offering of their vain systems at the foot of the cross to the pretended folly of our preaching. This is the old man they must chiefly put off, before they can be qualified to receive the heavenly gift, and to enter into the way of faith appointed by God for eternal salvation. If the Sceptics make an ill use of our mysteries to root themselves deeper in uncertainty, and if they object against us arguments ad hominem, so much the worse for them, unless God make use of their errors to make them see the necessity of submitting to his word.” This is what St Paul and his fellow Apostles would have answered to such objections. We ought to be fully persuaded, that if there had been occasion to give their decision upon the nature of the Heathen
philosophy with respect to the difficulty or readiness of embracing the gospel, they would have positively determined that die method, principles, practices, and disputes of the Peripatetics, Academics, &c. were so great an obstacle to faith, that the most necessary preliminaries to enter into the kingdom of God, were to forget or lay aside all this train of a false science. I believe they would have made such a determination both for the present and the time to come. These words in St John’s Gospel, chap. iii. ver. 3—“Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God,” are chiefly true with respect to philosophers: they want to be born again more than other men; they want one regeneration as men, and another as philosophers.I have cited an author who seems to believe that the subtilties of the schools of philosophy may, upon favourable occasions, serve to propagate the true faith. “It may be,” says he,77 “that these subtile doctors were necessary to the world, I mean the curious, disputing, and contradicting world. Perhaps they entered into the design of the providence of God, for the accomplishment of his son’s kingdom; for the last perfection of the economy of his church. You know that the Son of God sent several Apostles to several nations; you know that all the missions he ordained were not made at the same time, and by the twelve first Apostles. He never wanted, and will never want such ambassadors. He has always messengers ready to receive his orders, to execute his commands, to set out for his service. We ought not to doubt that he has more than one St Peter and St Paul. He has also more than one St Thomas. How do we know but that he has sent the St Thomas of the latter times to the successors of Aristotle, to treat them according to their own humour, and to convert them in their way, in order to gain them by their own
syllogisms and logic? How do we know but St Thomas of the schools has been chosen to be the apostle of the Peripatetic nation, which was not yet well conquered and subdued? A presumptuous and mutinous nation, which has so little regard to authority, which goes always upon reason, which continually demands why things are so and so, which is so restless, such an enemy to peace, and so fond of innovations? Methinks this last mission has not been useless, and there is some probability in what I say.” If there is no irony in this discourse, if it be all in a serious strain, it isA splendid nothing dress’d in lofty words.
All men in all ages have required and will require that the knowledge of revealed truths should be searched after by other methods than those of philosophy. Philosophy cures not a floating mind, which must be cured if we desire true wisdom by our prayers. Let us here give the authority of an Apostle. “If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God that gives to all men liberally, and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith nothing wavering, for he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, driven with the wind and tossed; for let not that man think that he shall receive any thing of the Lord.”78 Judge whether the Sceptics, who are always so much the more pleased, as the efforts they make to invent reasons for doubting of every thing have furnished them with specious objections against certainty, are capable of receiving the grace of God by the way of disputation. The modern missionaries of the gospel ought to treat them as the first would have done; they ought to advise them to lay aside all disputes and contentions, and to believe God upon his word, and if they prove untractable, they ought particularly to
remember this precept of St Paul, and apply it to those men: “Avoid foolish questions and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law, for they are unprofitable and vain. A man that is a Heretic after the first and second admonition, reject.”79 It would be fine work to see our Thomists and Scotists undertake the conversion of the new world by public disputations as in Europe; they would be sorry converters at that rate. Balzac did not consider it, or else gravely ridiculed the schoolmen: their public disputes convert nobody; every body goes away with the same opinions he brought with him. If we propose to the Chinese philosophers the Thomistical explications of our mysteries, and if they asked, how can we believe this, since we have no idea of it, we should do well to refer them, not to a disputation, but to an answer pretty like that which the angel Gabriel made to the Virgin Mary: “How shall this be, seeing I know not a man.” And the angel answered, and said unto her, “the Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee.”80We may affirm at this day, just as in Lactantius’s time, that true religion ought to be enquired after by applying to the pretended and seeming foolishness under which God has been pleased to hide the treasures of his wisdom. “Quid putemus fuisse causae, cur tot ingeniis, totque temporibus summo studio, et labore quaesita (sapientia) non reperiretur; nisi quod eam philosophi extra fines suos quaesierunt? Qui quoniam peragratis, et exploratis omnibus nusquam nullam sapientiam comprehenderunt; et alicubi esse illam necesse est: apparet, illic potissimum esse quaerendam, ubi stultitlÆ titulus apparet; cujus velamento Deus, ne arcanum summi sui divini operis in propatulo esset, thesaurum sapientiae, ac veritatis
abscondit.81—What is the reason why wisdom, which has been so frequently sought after by so many men of parts, with the greatest application and labour, has never been found, unless that the philosophers have sought after wisdom where she is not. Now, since these philosophers, who have examined and explored all things, have found wisdom no where, and since she must necessarily be somewhere, it is evident that she must be sought after chiefly where there appear the characters of foolishness, under the cover of which God, lest the mysteries of his Divine Works should be divulged, hath hid the treasures of wisdom and truth.” The same Lactantius has judiciously observed in another place, that it becomes the supreme majesty of God to speak with authority, and to say in a few words, this is true, and not to argue and add proofs to his decisions. “Quae (divina) quidem tradita sunt breviter, ac nude; nec enim decebat aliter: ut cum Deus ad hominem loqueretur, argumentis assereret suas voces, tanquam fides ei non haberetur: sed, ut oportuit, est locutus, quasi rerum omnium maximus judex; cujus est non argumentari, sed pronuntiare verum,82...Divine truths are declared in a few words, and without being supported by reasonings. Nor was it fit that God, when he speaks to men, should support his words by arguments, as if he ought not to be believed without proofs; but God hath spoken as it became him, like the sovereign judge of all things, who is not to argue, but to pronounce the truth.” If Seneca said that there is nothing more insipid than a law with a preamble, and that a law should not dispute, but command; if he said this of human laws, much more ought it to be said of the law of God. “Non probo, quod Platonis legibus adjecta principia sunt. Legem enim brevem esse oportet, quo facilius, ab imperitis teneatur, velut emissa divinitus vox sit. Jubeat, non disputet. Nihil videtur mihi frigidius, nihil ineptius, quam lex cum prologo. Mone, die quid me velis fecisse: non disco, sed pareo.—That reasons are annexed to the laws of Plato, is what I do not approve; for a law ought to be comprised in a very few words, that men of the meanest capacity may the better comprehend it, and consider it as a voice from heaven. Let it command, and not dispute. Nothing seems to me more insipid, nor more foolish, than a law with a preamble. Warn me, tell me what you command me to do, and I do not learn of you, but obey?''From all that has been said, it is easy to conclude that we cannot be alarmed with the objections of the Sceptics, without discovering the weakness of our faith, and taking things in a wrong sense which ought to be taken in a right one.
A true believer, a Christian who well understands the spirit of his religion, does not expect to see it agree with the aphorisms of the Lyceum, nor to find it able by the mere strength of reason, to confute the difficulties of reason. He well knows that natural things have no proportion to the supernatural; and that if a philosopher were desired to level and adjust the mysteries of the gospel with the Aristotelian axioms, it would be requiring of him what is inconsistent with the nature of things. You must necessarily make an option betwixt philosophy and the gospel: if you will believe nothing but what is evident and agreeable to common notions, choose philosophy and leave Christianity. If you will believe the incomprehensible mysteries of religion, take Christianity and leave philosophy; for to enjoy at the same time evidence and incomprehensibility, is a thing impossible; the conjunction of these two things is no less impossible than the conjunction of the properties of a square and of a circle. You must necessarily make
an option between them: if the conveniences of a round table do not satisfy you, make a square one; and do not pretend that the same table should furnish you with the conveniences both of a round table and of a square table. Once more, a true Christian, well instructed in the character of supernatural truths, and well grounded in the principles peculiar to the gospel, will laugh at the subtilties of philosophers, and especially of the Sceptics. Faith will place him above the regions wherein the storms of disputation rage. He will find himself in a post whence, being calm and undisturbed, he can hear the thunder of argumentations and distinctions roar below him: a post that will prove the true Olympus of the poets and the true temple of the sages; whence he will see, in perfect tranquillity, the weakness of reason, and the errors of men who have no other guide. Every Christian who suffers himself to be startled and offended with the objections of unbelievers, is in the same lamentable condition as they are.What I am going to say may teach us how important it is to know the true use of things. Several people have asked, to what purpose I have set forth many sceptical and Manichean objections? I think they could not much complain, if I should only ask them, to what purpose are so many particulars we find in historians? Is it not certain that historians relate several things whose only use consists in pleasing the readers, and which may be hurtful in the hands of those who abuse the best things? Does this free a historian from the obligation he is under of relating the truth with all possible exactness? Must not therefore a historian of opinions exactly and fully show the strong and weak sides of them, though it should accidentally occasion some disturbance, and though no other good should proceed from it but the amusement of the reader, and an example of the regard that is due to the laws of history? But this
is neither the sole nor the principal answer I am to give.Nothing is more necessary than faith, and nothing more important than to know well the worth of this theological virtue. But is any thing more proper to acquaint us with it than meditating on the attribute which distinguishes it from the other acts of the understanding? Its essence consists in imprinting in us a strong persuasion of revealed truths, by the sole motive of God’s authority. They who, by philosophical reasons, believe the immortality of the soul, are orthodox, but while they go no farther, they do not partake of the faith we speak of. They partake of it only as they believe this truth, because God has revealed it, and humbly submit to the voice of God the most plausible arguments philosophy offers to persuade them of the soul’s mortality. Thus the merit of faith is enlarged, in proportion as revealed truth, which is the object of it, exceeds all the powers of our understanding: for the more the incomprehensibility of this object increases, by the numerous maxims of natural light which oppose it, the more we must sacrifice to God’s authority a stronger repugnance of reason, and consequently we show ourselves more obedient to God, and give him a greater proof of our respect than if the thing were moderately difficult to believe. Whence was it that the father of the faithful had so eminent and illustrious a faith? Was it not because “he believed in hope against hope?”83 There had been no great merit in hoping upon the promise of God for a thing naturally very probable; the merit therefore consisted in this, that the hope grounded on this promise was contrary to all appearances. Let us say likewise, that the most precious faith is that which upon the Divine testimony embraces such truths as are the most repugnant to reason.
This thought has been expressed in a ludicrous way by a masterly hand: “the devil take me if I believed a syllable then,” said the Mareschal d’Hocquincourt; “but ever since I could endure to be crucified for religion. Not that I see more reason in it now; but on the contrary, less than ever: but for all that, I could suffer myself to be crucified without knowing why or wherefore. ‘So much the better, my lord,' replied the father, twanging it devoutly through the nose; ‘so much the better; these are not human motions; they proceed from God. No reason! that is the true religion: no reason. What an extraordinary grace, my lord, has heaven bestowed upon you! Estate sicut infinites, be ye as children: children have still their innocence, and why? Because they have no reason. Beati pauperes spiritu, blessed are the poor in spirit; they sin not; the reason is because they have no reason. No reason: without knowing why or wherefore: oh, excellent words! they ought to be written in golden letters. Not that I see more reason in it now; but on the contrary, less than ever. In truth this is divine for them that have any taste of heavenly things. No reason! What an extraordinary grace, my lord, has God bestowed upon you!’” 84 Give this thought a more serious and modest turn, and it will become reasonable. Here is the proof of it. I take it from a book wherein some thoughts of M. de St Evremond are examined; and this amongst others, that our understanding is not sufficiently convinced of the truth of religion.
" To answer clearly to this, we must remember a maxim commonly received among divines: viz. that the mind is induced to believe mysteries in a quite different way from that which gives it an evident knowledge of natural things. It knows the latter by
demonstration, and it believes mysteries upon motives of credibility; such as are the miracles wrought by Jesus Christ and his apostles, the unanimous belief of all the faithful for seventeen centuries, &c. All which motives ought to induce us to believe prudently the faith which the church proposes to us: and this very well explains these words of St Paul, “that in this present life we see the mysteries as riddles, waiting to see them evidently in heaven.” But M. de St Evremond requires demonstration. He therefore admits no faith. St Thomas says expressly in some places of his Summa, “that no body ought to go about to demonstrate the mysteries of religion;” and he adds in other chapters, “that when the fathers proved the faith, they did not pretend their arguments were demonstrative, but only solid motives to induce us to believe the doctrines propounded to us.” “Why,” says M. de St Evremond, is not our reason enlightened?” “Because,” as St Thomas says, “reason must submit to faith.” Upon which I call to mind some words of Petrus Blesensis in his 140th Epistle written to Petrus Diaconus, who was with the king of England. After he had spoken of the mystery, of transubstantiation, “reason,” pursues he, “does not go so far, but we are carried thither by faith; a faith that is so much the stronger as it is not supported by natural reason. Reason grows weak where faith grows strong: reason is overcome that faith may be more meritorious: however do not think,” adds this father, “that reason envies the superiority of faith; on the contrary, it voluntarily and humbly submits to it. It will resume its light in heaven, where faith will not be, and then reason will reap what faith sows in the present life; and it is just it should reap the fruits of faith, since at present it debases itself that faith may reign in its full power.”This is the doctrine of the Roman catholics: take from it transubstantiation, and put the Trinity for
instance in its room, and the most orthodox protestant divines will subscribe to it. I shall quote two protestants, whose testimony will have the more weight, because they are of such professions as are not thought to insist much upon the humbling of reason and the exaltation of faith: one is a physician, the other a mathematician· The former declares, “that when he meditates on mysteries, he always stops when reason has arrived to this point, ‘ O the depth.'”85 He protests, “that if rebellious reason, or the devil endeavour to perplex him, he disengages himself from all their snares, by this one paradox of Tertullian; “this is certain, because it is impossible,” “It is my solitary recreation to pose my apprehension with those involved enigmas and riddles of the Trinity, with the incarnation and resurrection. I can answer all the objections of Satan and my rebellious reason, with that odd resolution of Tertullian; ‘ it is true, because it is impossible.’ There are some,” continues he, “who believe more easily because they have seen the sepulchre of Jesus Christ, and the Red Sea, but for my part, I congratulate myself on not having seen Jesus Christ and his apostles, nor having lived in the age of miracles; my faith would then have been involuntary, and I should have no share in this blessing; ‘ blessed are they that have not seen, and yet believed.’” He highly values the faith of those who lived before Jesus Christ; for though they had nothing but shadows and types, and some obscure oracles, they waited for things that seemed impossible. “Some believe the better for seeing Christ’s sepulchre; and when they have seen the Red Sea, doubt not of the miracle. Now, contrarily, I bless myself, and am thankful that I lived not in the age of miracles, that I never saw Christ nor his disciples; I would not have been one of those Israelites that passed the Red Sea, nor one of Christ’s patients, on whom he wrought his wonders; then had my faith been thrust upon me; nor should I enjoy that greater blessing pronounced to all that believe and saw not. It is an easy and necessary belief, to credit what our eye and sense hath examined: I believe he was dead and buried, and rose again; and desire to see him in his glory, rather than to contemplate him in his cenotaph, or sepulchre. Nor is this much to believe; as we have reason, we owe this faith unto history: they only had the advantage of a bold and noble faith, who lived before his coming, who upon obscure prophecies and mystical types could raise a belief, and expect apparent impossibilities.”86 He says, “that faith may not improperly be called a sword, which cuts all the knots we meet with in the mysteries of religion;" but however, he uses it rather as a shield, finding that a man becomes invulnerable in these sorts of combats, who arms himself with it. He mentions the objections which reason and experience suggested by him on some points; and adds, that notwithstanding this his faith is very steady, and that faith, in order to be perfect, must make us believe things not only above reason, but that seem repugnant to reason, and to the testimony of the senses. “Yet do I believe that all this is true, which indeed my reason would persuade me to be false; and this I think is no vulgar part of faith, to believe a thing not only above, but contrary to reason, and against the arguments of our proper senses.”This writer speaks thus in a book intitled, “Religio Medici, the Physician’s Religion,” and which as some say might be called the “Physician of Religion;” a book, in short, that made some people believe that the author was somewhat remote from the kingdom of
heaven. Therefore these words of the Gospel might be applied to him, “I have not found so great faith, no not in Israel.”The mathematician I am to quote published at London, in 1699, a tract of 36 pages in 4to. intituled, “Theologiae Christianae principia Mathematica.” He pretends, that the principles of the Christian Religion are only probable, and reduces the degrees of their probability, and the decrease of it, to geometrical calculations. He finds that it may still last 1454 years; whence he concludes that Jesus Christ will return before that time. He dedicates this book to the bishop of Salisbury, and shows in his Epistle Dedicatory, that they who shall blame him for calling the principles of Christianity only probable, are such as have not well examined the grounds of their religion, and do not well understand the nature of faith. “Whence,” says he, “has this virtue so many encomiums given it in the Scripture, and so many rewards promised it? Is it not because it makes men walk in the right way, notwithstanding all the stumbling blocks they meet with, and the fetters that are put upon them?” I shall set down his words: “Quosdam fore non dubito, majori ductos zelo quam judicio qui meos prorsus condemnabunt labores, meque Religionem potius evertere quam astruere temere nimis concludent. Illi utique omnia Religionis dogmata tanquam certissima amplectentes rem Christianismo indignam me praestitisse putabunt, qui ejus probabilitatem tantum evincere conatus fuerim. Illis vero ego nihil jam habeo quod dicam, nisi quod praejudiciis suis praeoccupati, Religionis quam profitentur, fundamenta non accurate satis hactenus examinaverint, nec fidei, quae tantopere in sacris literis laudatur, naturam rite intellexerint. Quid enim est fides? nisi illa mentis persuasio qua propter media ex probabilitate deducta, quasdam propositiones veras esse credimus. Si persuasio ex certitudine oriatur, tum non fides sed scientia in mente
producitur. Sicut enim probabilitas fidem generat, ita enim scientiam evertit et è contra: Certitudo scientiam simul generat et fidem destruit. Unde scientia omnem dubitandi ansam aufert, dum fides aliquam semper haesitationem in mente relinquit: et propterea fides tantis insignitur laudibus, tantaque sibi annexa praemia habet, quod homines non obstantibus omnibus illis quibus premuntur scrupulis in recto virtutis et pietatis tramite progrediantur, quaeque Creatori suo omnipotenti grata futura credunt summa ope praestare conentur: Se tam paratos esse jussis quibuscunque divinis obsequi ostendunt, ut ne ea quidem quae probabiliter tantum ab ipso proveniant, rejicere velint.87 —I doubt not but certain persons, more zealous than judicious, will absolutely condemn my work, and rashly conclude that I rather subvert and overthrow religion, than support and defend it; for they, embracing all the doctrines of the Christian religion as most certain, will think that I have written a book unbecoming and unworthy of a Christian, since I there have endeavoured to show only the probability of that religion. To these persons I have at present nothing more to say than this, that being prepossessed with prejudices, they have not yet sufficiently examined the foundation of that religion which they profess, nor well understood the nature of that faith which is so much praised in the sacred writings: for what is faith but that persuasion of the mind whereby we believe certain propositions to be true, for reasons drawn from probability? If the persuasion arise from certainty, it is not faith but science that is produced in the mind; for as probability begets faith, so it destroys science; and so, vice versá, certainty begets science and destroys faith. Thus science removes all manner of doubt, whereas faith always leaves in the mind some hesitation; and it is for this reason that faith is so highly commended, and so many rewards are annexed to it, namely, because men, notwithstanding all those scruples wherewith their minds are oppressed, walk in the strait road of virtue and piety, and with all their might endeavour to perform those duties which they believe will be acceptable to their omnipotent Creator. They show themselves so ready to obey all divine commands, that they will not reject even those which only appear probably to be such.”Most men so little examine the nature of divine faith, and reflect so seldom upon this act of their mind, that they want to be roused from their negligence, by a long enumeration of the difficulties that encompass the doctrines of the Christian religion. It is by a lively sense of those difficulties we learn the excellency of faith, and of this gift of God. Hereby we learn also to mistrust reason, and have recourse to grace. They who know nothing of the great contest between reason and faith, and are ignorant of the force of philosophical objections, have but an imperfect sense of God’s goodness to them, and the manner of triumphing over all the temptations of incredulous and presumptuous reason.
The true way of humbling it is to know that, if it be capable of inventing objections, it is incapable of resolving them, and in a word, that it is not by reason that the Gospel was established. “It is faith alone that can teach that divine philosophy which none of the princes of this world had known. Whoever opens his eyes to so pure a light, is truly enlightened. It was not by strength of syllogisms and argumentations that this philosophy recommended itself to men; but by its simplicity, and the ignorance of those who preached it to the world. Faith, having discovered to men the false glimpses that shone in the Heathen philosophy, accustomed them not to reason any longer upon things which God would not submit to reasoning, and taught them that it is better to be ignorant of what God has been pleased to conceal, and with a respectful
ignorance to adore the secrets he has not revealed than to attempt to fathom this abyss of light, by the rashness of our conjectures, and the faint views of our reason. It was to this divine ray of faith, that the Christian took pleasure to sacrifice that insolent curiosity, which made him too rashly examine the works of God, by examining the effects of nature, and stifle all the views of that proud reason, which fixes him to the creatures, and makes him a rebel against the Creator. It was by the rays of this celestial light, that the Christian perceived it was better to yield than to argue in point of religion; that narrowness of wit is more advantageous to a Christian, than all the force and penetration of the mind, and that the simplicity of faith is preferable to all the pomp of science. Since after all, the works of God which bear the most the stamp of his omnipotence and his character, are those we the least comprehend, therefore nothing is more just than to humble our reason, and submit it to the light of eternal reason, which is the rule of all reasons: and indeed there is no science but requires submission for the establishment of its principles.’88 I conclude with two very fine thoughts of M. de St Evremond: in things purely natural, it is the mind’s part to conceive, and its knowledge goes before the affection for the objects: in things supernatural, the soul is taken, it is affected, it adheres and unites itself without ever comprehending them. Heaven has better prepared our hearts for the impression of God’s grace, than our understandings for illumination. His immensity confounds our narrow intellects: his bounty agrees better with our love. There is I know not what within us, that secretly pleads for a God whom we cannot comprehend. To consider well the Christian religion, would make us think that God had deprived it of the light of our minds, that it might turn more upon the motions of our heart.’”89 Provided a man have reduced his reason so far, as not to argue upon things which God would not subject to reasoning, it is all we can desire. I not only believe with Solomon, that a wise man’s silence is better in this case than the discourse of a philosopher, but I have a greater esteem for the faith of the most stupid peasant, than for all the lessons of Socrates.This, I think, is more than sufficient to remove the scruples which the pretended triumph of the sceptics had raised in the minds of some of my readers. Explanation concerning Sceptics, appended to THE SECOND EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY.